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1Abstract: This paper provides empirical evidence on the party incumbency advantage in
mayoral elections in Germany. Using a regression discontinuity design on a data set of about
25,000 elections, I estimate a causal incumbency eﬀect of 38-40 percentage points in the
probability of winning the next mayor election. The electoral advantage is larger for full-
time mayors, increasing in municipality size, independent of the speciﬁc partisanship of the
mayor and constant between 1945 and 2010. Moreover, it increases with local spending hikes
and it is independent of municipal debt. I also illustrate the causal dynamic eﬀects of the
incumbent status on distant future elections and therefore evaluate the global properties of
the LATE estimate. Finally, I show that the total eﬀect is due to an eﬀect on the probability
that the party participates in the next election (about 40% of the total eﬀect) and an eﬀect
on the vote share (about 60%).
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21 Introduction
A central feature in most democracies is that the citizens elect members of a party into
political positions. It is well known that these incumbents in the political oﬃce receive
an incumbency advantage in future elections for the same oﬃce. Theorists in political
science and political economics have long recognized the speciﬁc role of incumbents (see,
e.g., Besley and Case (1995), Alesina and Rosenthal (1995), Persson and Tabellini (2000)).
Starting with Erikson (1971), a large strand of empirical literature investigates the issue of
incumbency and the intrinsic advantage that parties and candidates derive from holding a
political oﬃce during reelection campaigns.1
Lee (2008) was ﬁrst to examine the empirical facts of this phenomenon by applying rigorous
identiﬁcation techniques from the program evaluation literature. He investigates elections
for the US House of Representatives and analyses the eﬀect of party incumbency on the
probability of winning the subsequent election. Lee estimates the intrinsic electoral advan-
tage to be around 45 percentage points in probability of winning the seat.
Following Lee’s analysis, a number of studies use similar designs to estimate the incumbency
advantage of parties in diﬀerent settings. Ferreira and Gyourko (2009) study the eﬀects of
incumbency in mayoral elections in the United States, ﬁnding an incumbency eﬀect of about
32 percentage points for the probability of reelection.2 For Germany, Hainmueller and Kern
(2005) investigate the party incumbency advantage within districts for federal elections and
Ade and Freier (2011) show that a positive incumbency advantage also persists in German
state elections. In the context of developing countries, researchers ﬁnd substantial negative
eﬀects (see Linden (2004) and Uppal (2005) for India, Miguel and Zahidi (2004) for Ghana
or Titiunik (2009) for Brazil).
This paper studies the electoral advantage for the party of incumbent mayors in German
municipalities. Estimation results from a regression discontinuity design (RDD) show an
eﬀect on the order of 38-40 percentage points in increasing the probability of winning the
next election. The results remain stable over a range of diﬀerent speciﬁcations and a number
of tests validate the credibility of the research design.
Analysing the eﬀect further, I ﬁnd that about 15-16 percentage points (hence, 40% of the
total eﬀect) are due to diﬀerences in the probability that the party participates in the next
1See among others , Cover (1977), Krehbiel and Wright (1983), Jacobson (1987), Gelman and King (1990)
King and Gelman (1991), Levitt and Wolfram (1997), Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart (2000), Cox
and Katz (2002), and Ansolabehere and Snyder (2004).
2See also the analysis by Folke and Snyder (2010), who investigate the incumbency advantage and its
determinants for US governors.
3election. Parties of close winners are on average more likely to participate in the subsequent
mayor elections than parties of close losers. The remaining 23-24 percentage points (60%
of the total eﬀect) stem from an increase in the party’s vote share.
Given that the data spans more than 60 years, I can identify the eﬀect of party incumbency
on distant future elections. This paper is ﬁrst to show that an electoral advantage can be
found not only in the next, but also in the following subsequent mayoral election, although
the estimates are insigniﬁcant in some speciﬁcations. This analysis is of particular interest
as it provides an idea about the implied global properties of the local “‘one-period” eﬀect
(the local average treatment eﬀect or LATE). I show that the observed dynamic causal
eﬀect falls short of the implied global eﬀect, based on extrapolation of the local “one-period”
estimate.
The data used in the analysis come from the state of Bavaria in Germany and comprise
more than 25,000 individual mayoral elections. Due to the exceptional richness of the data,
I can also explore the results for a number of subgroups. Although the ﬁndings from the
subgroup analyses must be taken with caution, I highlight some interesting correlations that
shed light on the underlying mechanisms at work. I ﬁnd that the incumbency advantage
is larger for full-time mayors, increasing in municipality size, independent of the particular
partisanship of the mayor and constant over time.
Furthermore, I use key economic variables to evaluate whether the voting decision on the
incumbent mayor is contingent on past economic performance. Voters seem to reward the
incumbent mayor if spending increases over and above the general level, but fail to punish
if municipal debt levels increase. Using additional data, I report no signiﬁcant diﬀerences
between estimates from diﬀerent German states.
I use close elections to identify quasi-experimental variation in the partisanship of the
mayor. I argue that the precise election outcome is subject to a random component when
the election is exceptionally close. Under this assumption, treatment just above the deﬁn-
ing threshold of 50% in vote share is assigned quasi-randomly. The party incumbency
advantage eﬀect is, then, consistently estimated from the regression discontinuity design,
as the continuity assumption directly follows from local randomization. This identiﬁcation
strategy is used in a number of studies, not just to estimate the eﬀect of incumbency, but
also in other contexts.3
3The idea was ﬁrst used in parallel discussion papers, which came out in the year 2001, by Pettersson-
Lidbom (2008), who evaluates the economic policy consequences of party block mayorities in Swedish
councils and by Lee (2008) (mentioned above). For further applications, see, e.g., Ferreira and Gyourko
(2009) and Gerber and Hopkins (2011) on partisan eﬀects of US mayors, Eggers and Hainmueller (2009)
on ﬁnancial beneﬁts to MP’s in Great Britain, Brollo and Nannicini (2011) on ﬁscal transfers in Brazil.
4One critic of this approach is Caughey and Sekhon (2010), who reassess the study by Lee
(2008) and point out that the identifying assumptions may not necessarily hold. They
argue that the extent to which elections might be subject to a random event might diﬀer
and that careful testing of the underlying assumptions is necessary to validate the research
design. I test and conﬁrm that the identifying assumption is valid for the application at
hand.
The paper is structured as follows. I describe the institutional background and the data
set in section 2. In section 3, I lay out the empirical methodology. Section 4 discusses the
main results and investigates the validity of the research design. Section 5 concludes the
analysis.
2 Data and institutional setting
In Germany, the municipal level is the lowest of the four governmental tiers.4 Local govern-
ments in Germany oversee local public ﬁrms, administrate mandated spending allocated by
higher tiers and carry out a number of direct responsibilities such as child care provision,
expenditures for culture and recreation as well as investments in local infrastructure. The
average budget of a German municipality is about 1400 Euro per capita. In total, about 1
3
of total government spending is allocated to the local level. The municipalities also oversee
about 40% of all government personnel. The aﬀairs of the municipality are in the joint
responsibility of the mayor and the municipal council.5
In this study, I mainly use data on mayors from the German state of Bavaria. Here,
the mayor is granted a strong and independent position by the South German Council
Constitution (Süddeutsche Ratsverfassung). The constitution puts the mayor in charge
of the local administration, municipality personnel and all day-to-day decisions. In local
politics, the mayor heads the city council (with active voting rights), presides over all council
committees and sets the local policy agenda. In many municipalities, she is often the only
full-time working politician. Despite this powerful position of the mayor, it should be noted
that the council remains the legislative body for all municipality decisions.
Mayors are directly elected by the voters.6 Mayors are elected for a period of 6 years and
the election is typically simultaneous with the local city council election. If the ﬁrst-ballot
4Beside the federal level, Germany is organized in 16 states (of which 3 are city states), about 450 counties
and about 12500 municipalities.
5See Bundesbank (2007).
6Bavaria is in fact only one of two states in Germany (the other being Baden-Württemberg) where the
mayor is directly elected since World War II. Most German states only instituted direct mayoral elections
at the beginning of the 1990s.
5is indecisive (no candidate above 50%) the law requires a second, run-oﬀ, election in which
the two leading candidates compete. The position of the mayor can be either full-time or
part-time.7
In total, I observe the results of 25,180 elections since 1945 for 2,056 municipalities.8 More
than 45 percent of all elections are single-candidate elections, while about 38 percent had
2 candidates, 11 % had 3 candidates, 4% had 4 candidates, and less than 1% had 5 or
more candidates. In the analysis, I use the observations of two parties: center-right (CSU
- ‘Christlich Soziale Union’)9 and center-left (SPD - ‘Sozialdemokratische Partei Deusch-
lands’). Results of other parties are not considered in the analysis.10 If both the center-right
and the center-left party ﬁeld a candidate in a mayoral election, I will treat them as sepa-
rate observations.11 As the electoral rule in Bavaria allows for candidates to be supported
by several parties, I recode joint nominations to be nominations of the party indicated to
be the primary aﬃliation. Moreover, I use the result of the run-oﬀ election, if applicable.
Table 1 illustrates the scope of the data set. In total, I have 18,761 observations for which
I can link the outcome of a center-left or center-right candidate in t   1 to the outcome of
this party in a subsequent mayor election in t within the same municipality. As indicated in
the table, about 2
3 of those observations come from the center-right party that participates
most often in local mayor races. The table also presents the number of observations within
subsamples restricted by the size of the margin of victory. To eﬀectively exclude single-
candidate elections, I restrict the general sample to be within the 60% winning margin.12
Moreover, I highlight the number of observations in the samples within the 5%, 2% and 1%
margin of victory.
7The current law prescribes that a municipality is to have a part-time mayor if it has 5,000 or fewer
residents, however communities may deviate from this rule. Communities with more than 5,000 and
10,000 or fewer residents are expected to have a full-time employed mayor, however, deviations from this
rule are allowed. Communities with more than 10,000 citizens are required to have a full-time mayor.
In practice, all municipalities with at least 7,500 inhabitants or more have full-time mayors.
8In Bavaria, there are 2,056 municipalities as of 2008. Note, that Bavaria saw changes in the municipality
structure in the end of the 1960s and beginning of the 1970s.
9The CSU is an independent party existing only in Bavaria. At the federal level, the party forms a close
alliance with the CDU (‘Christlich Demokratische Union’) and, eﬀectively, acts as one party.
10The reason is twofold. For smaller parties, such as the Greens (‘Die Grünen’) or the liberal party (FDP
- ‘Freie Demokratische Partei’), winning the mayor’s oﬃce is very rare and those observations might be
special in their own regards. In contrast, local independent parties are often very strong and regularly
win mayor elections. However, the local party identity is often not ﬁx over time and such party groups
sometimes only form to support a speciﬁc candidate.
11As those observations might be subject to common shocks, I will cluster standard errors in the analysis
at the level of each municipal election.
12Thus, in a two candidate election the winning candidate won with a maximum of 80 percent of the vote.
In single-candidate elections, the participant runs against herself and usually receives 80-100% of all
votes.
6Table 1: Data set description
All Center-left Center-right
Observations
total 18761 6692 12069
within 60% margin 13797 5525 8272
within 5% margin 1231 817 414
within 2% margin 487 314 173
within 1% margin 220 142 78
Elected mayors 4006 9817
Source: Own calculations, based on the data provided by the federal election
oﬃce. Center-left refers to the social-democrats (SPD) and center-right refers to
the conservative Christian democrats (CDU).
In table 2, I show descriptive statistics of the main variables used in the analysis. For the
full sample, the average number of voters is 3,454. Further, 45% of the elections in the
data set have candidates competing for a full-time mayoral position. The vote share of
the winner in t   1 is, by deﬁnition, restricted to be greater than 50% and is, on average,
72%. As outcome variables in t, I highlight the vote share of the center-left and center-right
party respectively (conditional on participation in t and t   1). Panel 2 of table 2 shows
the descriptive ﬁgures for the number of voters and the distribution of the mayor status
for the sample within the 5% margin. I ﬁnd that observations for which the election were
close in t   1 are slightly larger on average and had a larger share of full-time mayors.
Table 2: Data set - descriptive statistics of the variables
Variable Observations Mean Std. dev Min Max
Panel 1 : Variables in the full sample
Number of voters 18761 3454.7 3689.3 20 38461
Dummy for mayor status 18625 0.45 0.50 0 1
Vote share of the winner 18755 0.72 0.16 0.5001 1
Vote share of the center-right 10073 0.64 0.24 0.004 1
Vote share of the center-left 4758 0.49 0.25 0.028 1
Panel 2 : Variables in the 5% margin sample
Number of voters 1231 4143.1 4581.3 166 36876
Dummy for mayor status 1217 0.51 0.50 0 1
Notes: The table shows the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analysis. The vote share of the
winner refers to the election in t-1. The vote shares of the center-right and the center-left party refer to the
outcome of these parties in the election at t, conditional on participation in t and t-1. Panel 2 highlights the
descriptives for the number of voters and the dummy for the mayor status (0 = part-time and 1= full-time
employed) within the sample of elections that was as close a 5% in the margin of victory (in t-1). Source: Own
calculations, based on the data provided by the federal election oﬃce.
To investigate interesting subsamples, I supplement the data with a number of additional
7variables on ﬁscal characteristics for the period 1983-2007. In particular, I collected yearly
per capita data on total municipality expenditures, local public debt, revenue from local
trade tax and an indicator of the tax power (deﬁned as own revenue from local taxes divided
by total revenue from all sources).
3 Empirical model and methodology
In this section, I describe the empirical strategy pursued, which is based on a regression
discontinuity design (RDD). The object of interest is the eﬀect of party incumbency on
subsequent mayoral election outcomes. I denote this treatment with the dummy variable
d
p
i;t, where the superscript p refers to the party identity, i refers to the municipality and
t denotes the election period. The treatment variable is uniquely determined by a score
variable (also referred to as running variable), the margin of victory, v
p
i;t. The margin of
victory (or loss) is deﬁned as the distance in vote share of the party to the best opponent.
If the margin of victory is positive in t   1, the party has its candidate in oﬃce during the










I consider election outcomes from the subsequent mayoral elections within the municipality
i as outcomes variables and denote them y
p
i;t. Note that the outcome is indexed with t,
as the outcome will be measured at the end of election period t. As outcome variables,
I consider an indicator variable that takes the value one when the party wins oﬃce in t.
Alternatively, I also look at the vote share of the party in the next election and a dummy
indicating whether the party ran a candidate. Furthermore, I will also consider outcomes
of mayor elections further apart into the future, at t + 1, t + 2 and t + 3.
The problem of estimation is twofold. First, I am interested in obtaining consistent esti-
mates for the causal eﬀect of political incumbency of a party on future election outcomes.
Second, I want to investigate the eﬀect in various subgroups. For clarity, I will turn to each
of these problems separately.
I follow Pettersson-Lidbom (2008) and Lee (2008)13 in their use of RDD.14 The basic model
is given as follows:
13A similar framework is used by Hainmueller and Kern (2008) in the setting of German district candidates
in federal election as well as by Ferreira and Gyourko (2009) for US mayors.
14The RDD intuition was ﬁrst developed by Thistlethwaite and Campell (1960) to test the eﬀect of schol-
arships on subsequent educational attainment of college students. Hahn, Todd, and van der Klaauw
(2001) clariﬁed the conditions needed to estimate treatment eﬀects from a RDD.
8y
p
i;t = 0 + 1d
p
i;t + i;t for jv
p
i;t 1j <  (2)
where 1 is the parameter measuring the incumbency eﬀect. In this limited sample model,
the regression analysis is based only on observations within a small margin, , from the








i;t 1;) + i;t (3)
Here, the analysis can rely on a larger set of observations. The ﬂexible function h() then
represents the inﬂuence of the margin of victory on the election outcome on election day t.
The intuition of the RDD is to focus on the observations just around the threshold. Assum-
ing that the margin of victory v
p
i;t 1 contains a random component and cannot be precisely
manipulated by the parties, observations just right and left of this decisive threshold should
have the same characteristics both observable and unobservable. The main argument for
the validity of the RDD used here is that election results in German mayoral elections are
suﬃciently prone to random factors that can shift the election outcome within a small mar-
gin.15 Such factors could be things that aﬀect, for example, participation (like weather or
simultaneously held higher level elections, (see Knack (1994.)))16 or direct shocks in party
popularity (e.g. media coverage of political scandals).
The formal identifying assumption required for the RDD to hold is the continuity assump-
tion (see Lee and Lemieux (2009)). Around the threshold, all characteristics, except treat-
ment, must be distributed continuously for the identiﬁcation to be valid. If no covariates
besides treatment changed at the threshold, the eﬀect of treatment on the outcome can
be consistently estimated. Note, that continuity is a direct result of randomization at the
threshold.
The limited sample approach, eq. 2, makes direct use of this idea. Here I compare election
outcomes only for the samples within a small margin from the threshold. In the analysis, I
rely on a margin of 2 percent in the margin of victory. Hence, I compare treatment between
observations in which a mayoral race was decided by no larger margin than a 51-49 split.
15The argument of randomness in elections is not just a point made by empiricists, also theoretical models
in political economy often rely on a similar assumption. Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) introduced the
thought of random chance in elections in their model of probabilistic voting which has come to be a
standard model of voting theory.
16Participation shocks could shift election results especially when they apply to some groups of voters more
than to others.
9To obtain a consistent estimate of the treatment eﬀect, I must assume that the winner of
such a close race was eﬀectively randomly chosen.
By including the control function h(), the RDD can maintain the same identifying as-
sumption, but allow for estimation with the entire sample. Introducing a ﬂexible functional
form of the margin of victory in the full sample regression, any correlation of treatment
with omitted variables in the error term can be controlled for. However, the additional
assumption then is that the control function is correctly speciﬁed. In practice, I use various
parametric polynomial speciﬁcations of diﬀerent degrees to illustrate that the eﬀects found
are not relying on precise functional form assumptions.
It is important to note that I estimate the incumbency of parties and not of speciﬁc candi-
dates. While it might at ﬁrst appear to be more intuitive to study the incumbency eﬀects of
speciﬁc candidates that run for consecutive elections, such an analysis requires signiﬁcantly
more data and econometric modeling. For detailed discussion of diﬀerences between the
incumbency party estimator (as proposed by Lee (2008)), the incumbent advantage estima-
tors by Gelman and King (1990) (also see Cox and Katz (2002)) as well as by Ansolabehere,
Snyder, and Stewart (2000) can be found in Caughey and Sekhon (2010).
Due to the richness of the data, I can investigate the size of the incumbency party eﬀect
in various subgroups. To compare subgroup results, I split the sample and run separate
regressions. In practice, the sample is divided into two distinct subsamples (E = 0 and
E = 1) along a speciﬁc dimension. The dimensions considered are: status of the mayor
(part-time or full-time employed), municipality size (above and equal 5,000 voters or below),
party identity of the mayor (center-left or center-right), time of the election (before or after
1980), the change of expenditure (high or low changes), the change of debt (high or low
changes) and the change of the local tax base (high or low changes). For the ﬁscal data, I












E) + i;t for E = f0;1g (4)
Subgroup estimations provide hints as to what are the contributing factors that generate
the incumbency eﬀect. However, they are limited in their potential to identify a speciﬁc
causal eﬀect of the subgroup characteristic. Say I ﬁnd, for example, a large incumbency
advantage eﬀect for full-time mayors but only a small eﬀect in the sample of part-time
mayors. It is now correct to say that within each of those samples, I have estimated a
consistent eﬀect. However, I cannot be sure that the diﬀerences are solely driven by the
status of the mayor and not by other sample characteristics that are also diﬀerent.
17The way I split the sample is similar to Folke and Snyder (2010).
10For predetermined variables (like the mayor status, municipality size, party identity and
time of the election) this problem is limited to uncontrolled subsample characteristics.
When I also consider sample splits based on postdetermined variables (ﬁscal characteris-
tics) there is the additional problem of sorting into the speciﬁc subgroups. Overall, these
analyses can highlight interesting diﬀerences in subgroups, however, interpretation of these
disparities is limited.
4 Results
The following section consists of three parts. In the ﬁrst part, I present the main results
of the RDD analysis, including the evidence from the dynamic analysis and a discussion of
the two potential mechanisms. The estimation results in various subgroups are highlighted
in part two. The third part focuses on a detailed validation of the RD design.
4.1 Main results
Table 3 presents the ﬁndings for the causal eﬀects of the electoral advantage for German
mayors. I evaluate the eﬀect of having a mayor of a certain party in oﬃce during the
election period in t   1 on the election outcome of this party in the next mayor election in
t. The dependent variable is an indicator that takes the value one if the party obtained the
mayor oﬃce in t. The columns show the basic eﬀects under diﬀerent speciﬁcations. The
results are generally stable over all speciﬁcations and range within 35%-42% increase in the
probability of holding oﬃce after the next election.
Columns 1-3 present the limited sample approach with varied closeness of the elections. In
column 2, the estimation uses a margin from the threshold of below 2 percentage points.
Each observation in this subsample is such that the party’s candidate either won or lost
with a distance to the best opponent of below 2 percentage points (hence at a maximum
distance of 51% to 49% when there are two candidates). Within this margin, I consider
the precise outcome of the local election to be a random event. I estimate the incumbency
advantage to be 38.9 percentage points in the probability of winning the election.
Alternatively, I also specify limited sample regressions with a margin of 5 and 1 percentage
points accordingly (see columns 1 and 3). The 5 percentage points margin might be hard
to defend as still random in treatment. The 1 percent sample, however, is quite restrictive
in the available sample. Using a control function, I present the results from three further
speciﬁcations (see columns 4-6). The estimation in column 4 uses a linear control function
with the 5% sample. Columns 5 and 6 use the full sample and a control function with a
11Table 3: Main results - incumbency eﬀect for mayors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel 1 : Probability of winning in ME in t
d 0.420*** 0.389*** 0.345*** 0.360*** 0.392*** 0.410***
(0.030) (0.048) (0.078) (0.063) (0.016) (0.035)
N 1231 487 220 1231 13797 13797
R2 0.177 0.152 0.119 0.178 0.313 0.314
Panel 2 : Probability of winning in ME in t+1
d 0.100*** 0.050 -0.033 0.008 0.064*** 0.100**
(0.031) (0.047) (0.069) (0.061) (0.019) (0.045)
N 1049 424 200 1049 10600 10600
R2 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.05
Sample 5 % 2 % 1% 5 % 60% 60%
Control function none none none linear linear 4rd order
Notes: Signiﬁcance levels: * p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01. Standard errors in parentheses are
robust and clustered on the level of each individual municipality election. The dependent variable in
Panel 1 is the indicator variable whether the respective party obtains the mayor’s oﬃce in t. In Panel 2,
the dependent variable is a similar indicator variable, however, the time is one extra election period into
the future (in t+1). The regressions in columns 1-3 are based on a limited sample within the respective
margins and include only a constant and the treatment dummy. The estimations in columns 4-6 include
a polynomial control function of the degree indicated which is speciﬁed to be ﬂexible on both sides of
the threshold. Source: Own calculations.
polynom of degree one and four respectively.18 All results are within a similar range and
none are statistically diﬀerent from the others.
Graphical evidence on the large scope of the eﬀect is presented in ﬁgure 1. The graph plots
the raw data in bins of the margin of victory in t 1 (1 percentage point bins) against the bin
average of the probability of gaining the oﬃce in t. To visualize the inherent discontinuous
jump at the threshold, I superimpose a regression ﬁt from a local linear regression. The
graph illustrates that a party that just lost the last mayoral race only has a 28-30 percent
chance to gain oﬃce (on average) compared to the winner of the last election who will win
with a probability of just under 70 percent.
I conclude that there is a large and persistent incumbency eﬀect in German mayoral elec-
tions. While the eﬀect may appear to be large at the outset, it is only slightly larger than
the results for US mayors. Ferreira and Gyourko (2009) report a discontinuous jump in the
probability of winning of 33% for Democratic mayor candidates in US cities. In contrast,
authors focusing on developing countries have found zero or even negative incumbency ef-
18The polynomial function is ﬂexible on either side of the threshold. I choose a polynomial of degree four
as the ﬁfth order was no longer signiﬁcant. All regressions use robust standard errors, clustered on the
level of each individual municipality election.














































Margin of victory in t−1
Notes: This ﬁgure graphically illustrates the discontinuous jump of the probability of winning in t at the
zero threshold of the margin of victory in t   1. For clarity the data have been grouped in bins, each bin
representing an interval of 1 percent in the margin of victory. The line ﬁtted onto the data is based on a
local kernel regression using endogenous Epanechnikov weights. Source: Own calculations.
fects (Titiunik (2009) for Brazilian mayors, Linden (2004) and Uppal (2005) for Indian
parliament, and Miguel and Zahidi (2004) for the parliament in Ghana). They interpret
their results to show that politicians engage in rent-seeking activities.
Interestingly the size of the incumbency advantage for German mayors is much larger than
the electoral advantage of German politicians in higher tiers. Hainmueller and Kern (2005)
report an incumbency eﬀect of a mere 1.4-1.7 percentage points for the party of a district
candidate in the election for the German parliament (Deutscher Bundestag). For German
state elections, Ade and Freier (2011) show that a similar incumbency eﬀect of 1.1-1.5
percentage points exists for district candidates.
In panel 2 of table 3, I present the incumbency eﬀect on the outcome of the mayoral elec-
tion in t + 1. This realization is two election periods (12 years) after the initial treatment.
Thereby, I ask whether party incumbency today aﬀects election outcomes over and beyond
the next mayor election. The empirical evidence is less clear. Point estimates range from
insigniﬁcant zero to a signiﬁcant 10 percentage point advantage. The results are not con-
clusive, but they suggest that merely a small eﬀect is persistent to also eﬀect distant future
elections.


















































































































































































































Margin of Victory in ME in t−1
t+3
Notes: This ﬁgure presents the dynamic analysis graphically. The four panels show the relationship between
the margin of victory in t-1 and the probability of obtaining the mayor’s oﬃce in t, t+1, t+2 and t+3 with a
special focus on the jump at the zero threshold. The data have been grouped in bins, each bin representing
an interval of 1 percent in the margin of victory. The line ﬁtted onto the scattered data is a polynomial
function of degree three which is ﬂexible on both sides of the threshold. Source: Own calculations.
In ﬁgure 2, I highlight the eﬀect on future mayor elections graphically. While the eﬀect
is clearly visible for the time period in t, the eﬀect is much smaller in t + 1 (about 8
percentage points). In election periods even further apart, I ﬁnd no signiﬁcant eﬀects any
longer, as indicated in the subgraphs at the bottom. These results highlight that, despite the
enormous incumbency eﬀect in the election directly following the treatment, the incumbency
advantage does not lead to a dynasty manifestation. One normative conclusion from that
is that term limits19 are indeed unnecessary if the objective is to prevent dynasty formation
based on the intrinsic electoral advantage of holding oﬃce.
Due to the nature of RDD, the estimated incumbency eﬀect of about 37-40 percentage
points can only be regarded as a local eﬀect. It is a valid measure only for elections there
were close races in t 1. The dynamic analysis gives rise to the conjecture that the results
are indeed not valid over the entire distribution of election results. If it were true that
every incumbent party received an electoral advantage of about 40 percentage points, then
I should observe the dynamic eﬀect on the election period in t+1 to be around 16 percentage
19There are no direct term limits for mayors in Bavaria.
14points.20
The local estimate seems to overstate the general overall party incumbency eﬀect. This
could be true, for instance, if elections close to the threshold are diﬀerent in nature to
other elections. For example, it is quite likely, that the elections that were close (on either
side of the threshold) at t are between candidates that have not been in oﬃce before and
are therefore both younger and “unconsumed”. For these elections, it is reasonable that
the winner will also seek reelection, whereas the likelihood of continuation might be much
smaller for candidates in elections that were not close in t-1.
While the probability of winning the next mayoral election is ultimately the most infor-
mative measure of the incumbency advantage, it is of interest to analyse the underlying
mechanisms that comprise this total eﬀect. The probability of winning is, in fact, inﬂu-
enced by two contributing factors: (a) a signiﬁcantly lower vote share in election at t for
the “marginal” losers in t   1 compared to the “marginal” winners, as well as (b) an eﬀect
on the probability that the party participates in the next election.
Table 4 presents the results of the RDD analysis along those dimensions. Panel 1 highlights
the eﬀect of just getting into oﬃce on the probability of running a candidate in the next
mayor election. The estimates show that there is a causal treatment eﬀect in the order
of 14-16 percentage points. A party that narrowly obtained the mayor’s oﬃce is therefore
about 14-16 percentage points more likely to run a candidate in the next election.
In the second panel, I illustrate the electoral advantage in terms of the received vote share.
The incumbent party receives a bonus of 15-17 percentage points in the next mayoral
election. Those estimates are not to be interpreted as causal eﬀects as these are potentially
biased due to selection. I observe vote shares only for parties that participated in the race
for mayor. The fact that parties can be expected to make a strategic choice in whether
to even participate or not introduces a selection bias into the estimate of the vote share
advantage. Moreover, the bias cannot be determined in sign.21
20Back of an envelope calculations are as follows: The elected party in t-1 can obtain oﬃce in t+1 either
by winning twice (0:7  0:7 = 0.49) or by losing int and later winning int+1 (0:3  0:3 = 0.09). The
observed probability of winning in t+1 under constant incumbency advantage should then be 0.49 +
0.09 = 0.58. Hence, given a global eﬀect of 40 percentage points, I should observe a 58 to 42 split also
in t+1 (hence an estimate of 16 percentage points). By the same logic, the implied eﬀect in t+2 would
be a 53.2 to 46.8 split.
21On the one hand, one could ﬁnd it intuitive to argue that only the candidates with the better outlook
for the elections, are prone to participate. Under this argument, the vote share (and the probability of
winning) just right of the threshold would be the outcome of the better candidates that remained after
the less strong politicians dropped out. Hence, the estimates would appear even larger once controlling
for participation. On the other hand, it is equally sensible to assume that the better candidates (in the
15Table 4: Decomposing the total eﬀect -two mecha-
nisms
(1) (2) (3)
Panel 1 : Prob of running in ME in t
d 0.160*** 0.158*** 0.141***
(0.034) (0.043) (0.020)
N 487 1231 18761
R2 0.04 0.04 0.15
Panel 2 : Vote share in ME in t
d 0.163*** 0.147*** 0.174***
(0.020) (0.026) (0.013)
N 403 1029 14831
R2 0.14 0.17 0.33
Sample 2 % 5 % full
Control function none linear 3rd order
Notes: Signiﬁcance levels: * p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01. Stan-
dard errors in parentheses are robust and clustered on the level of each
individual municipality election. In Panel 1, the dependent variable is
the indicator variable whether the respective party ran a candidate in
the mayor election in t. In Panel 2, the dependent variable is the vote
share that the party received in the mayor election in t. The regression
in columns 1 is based on a limited sample within a margin of victory of 2
percentage points and include only a constant and the treatment dummy.
The estimations in columns 2 is within the 5% margin and a linear con-
trol function and 3 runs the entire sample including a polynom control
function of third degree which is speciﬁed to be ﬂexible on both sides of
the threshold. Source: Own calculations.
Generally, I can conclude that both mechanism are of signiﬁcant importance. The increase
in the likelihood of the party participating in the mayor election can account for about 15
percentage points in the probability of winning. Given a total incumbency advantage of 38
percentage points in the reelection probability, the remaining 23 percentage are due to the
electoral gain in terms of vote share.
4.2 Subgroup analyses
Given the substantial number of elections in the analysis, I can also evaluate the RDD
estimate of the incumbency eﬀect on various subgroups. I consider two groups of variables
for which I investigate subgroup outcomes. In the ﬁnal part of this section, I further
highlight evidence from additional states both from the former west and the former east of
sense of them being more likely to win) have, in fact, better foresight into the outlook of the election
and can (given the large incumbency advantage) decide to drop out earlier. Under this argument, it
would in fact be the poorer candidates, for example, individuals with a strong ideological component,
who remain in the race. Here, the estimates would exhibit an upward bias.
16Germany.
Firstly, I analyse subgroup results along speciﬁc town characteristics. Here, I consider the
position of the mayor (full-time versus part-time), size of the municipality, the speciﬁc party
identity of the mayor and the time of the elections (before or after 1980).
The subgroup outcomes by position of the mayor and size of the town are of interest as
both dimensions are likely to be linked with the amount of resources that the incumbent
party can use to regain the mayor’s post (see, e.g., Levitt and Wolfram (1997), Stroemberg
and Snyder (2010), Serra (1994), Folke (2010)). Full-time mayors might have a signiﬁcantly
higher electoral advantage as they spend more time on the job, have more contact with the
constituency and are likely to have more coverage in the media. Also, parties in larger com-
munities are mostly better organized, have more members and higher electoral campaign
budgets.
The analysis of subgroups by the speciﬁc partisanship of the mayor is important to illustrate
the general nature of the intrinsic advantage.22 I expect that the ﬁndings are neutral with
respect to the partisanship of the mayor. Similarly, it is interesting to document potential
changes over time. Given that the period of observation goes back all the way to World
War II, I can compare estimates from Germany from when the democracy was still young
to a political system with more than 60 years of experience and stability (see, e.g, Titiunik
(2009)).
The second group of variables comprises information on the ﬁscal and budgetary state of
the municipality in the course of the election period. I ask whether the voters reward the
incumbent mayor when the per capita expenditures or the revenue from the local business
tax increase and whether they punish when the municipal debt rises. In essence, I ask
whether the ﬁscal measures are of importance for the electoral choice of the voters. This
analysis therefore relates to a large literature on economic voting (see, e.g., Folke and Snyder
(2010), Jordahl (2006), Wolfers (2007)). Moreover, it also helps to evaluate the extend to
which the inhabitants vote retrospectively in general (see, e.g., Berry and Howell (2007),
Ferejohn (1986), Fiorina (1978)).
As described above, the analyses in subgroups may again lead to issues of endogeneity that
the RDD initially attempts to avoid. What a subgroup analysis can do, is to highlight
interesting correlations and evaluate the heterogeneity of the party incumbency advantage
22Especially, given the fact that Bavaria is generally considered a conservative stronghold (it has seen no
state government other then a conservative since World War II).
17along the respective dimension. It cannot, however, allow for consistent estimation of the
causal impact of a speciﬁc characteristic on the size of the incumbency eﬀect.
Table 5: Subgroup analysis
Dependent variable: Probability of winning
E=0 E=1 Diﬀerence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel 1 : Town characteristics
Mayor status 0.211*** 0.300*** 0.546*** 0.512*** 0.336*** 0.212***
(E=0: part-time, E=1: full-time) (0.075) (0.049) (0.065) (0.049) (0.100) (0.069)
Municipality size 0.332*** 0.377*** 0.540*** 0.508*** 0.208* 0.132*
(E=0: <5000, E=1: >=5000) (0.057) (0.040) (0.093) (0.069) (0.109) (0.079)
Party identity of the mayor 0.359*** 0.381*** 0.439*** 0.452*** 0.081 0.071
(E=0: CDU, E=1: SPD) (0.052) (0.038) (0.066) (0.048) (0.064) (0.048)
Decade of the elections 0.340*** 0.341*** 0.411*** 0.445*** 0.071 0.103
(E=0: <1980, E=1: >= 1980) (0.089) (0.060) (0.060) (0.042) (0.109) (0.072)
Panel 2 : Fiscal characteristics
Diﬀ in total expenditures 0.283*** 0.373*** 0.551*** 0.531*** 0.267** 0.156*
(E=0: low, E=1: high) (0.091) (0.080) (0.092) (0.088) (0.128) (0.093)
Diﬀ in debt 0.407*** 0.419*** 0.379*** 0.433*** -0.028 0.014
(E=0: low, E=1: high) (0.079) (0.046) (0.121) (0.070) (0.141) (0.084)
Diﬀ in revenue trade tax 0.366*** 0.362*** 0.456*** 0.503*** 0.091 0.141*
(E=0: low, E=1: high) (0.084) (0.049) (0.113) (0.064) (0.144) (0.083)
Sample 2 % 60% 2 % 60% 2 % 60%
Control function none 3rd order none 3rd order none 4rd order
Notes: Signiﬁcance levels: * p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01. Standard errors in parentheses are robust and clustered on the
level of each individual municipality election. The dependent variables is the indicator variable whether the respective party obtained
the mayor’s oﬃce in t in the respective subsample indicated in the left column. The Columns 1 and 3 are based on a limited sample
within a margin of 2% for the subsample labeled with E=0 and E=1 respectively. Column 2 and 4 consider a 60% sample and a
cubic control function within the subsamples. Columns 5 and 6 show the estimated diﬀerence between the respective two samples.
Source: Own calculations.
Table 5 presents the results from the subgroup analyses. Panel 1 shows the results for
subgroups of certain town characteristics. Firstly, I split the sample by the mayor status
(full-time and part-time employed). I compare the estimates of the incumbency advantage
in the sample of only part-time (columns 1 and 2) with the sample of full-time employed
mayors (columns 3 and 4). The diﬀerence for the two alternative speciﬁcations is highlighted
in the last columns. I ﬁnd that full-time mayors receive a signiﬁcantly larger electoral bonus.
The incumbency advantage is 21-34 percentage points larger than that of part-time mayors.
18Next, I divide the sample by municipality size using a population threshold of 5000 voters.23
The incumbency advantage is larger in municipalities with more individuals, however, the
diﬀerences are only marginally signiﬁcant.
The estimates for the above subgroups highlight the speciﬁc issue of interpretation of the
subgroup estimates. The mayor status for example is, ex ante, given and hence exogenous
to the incumbent mayor. It is therefore correct to argue that the incumbency advantage is
larger in communities with a full-time mayor. However, I cannot claim causality. Towns
with a full-time mayor may also have other features in which they diﬀer, for example
municipality size. I cannot rule out that it is another mechanism that makes the electoral
advantage increase. However, it can be argued that the incumbency advantage estimate is
a reliable measure for municipalities with this characteristic.24
I test whether the speciﬁc partisanship of the mayor matters for the incumbency eﬀect in
the third row. As described above, I use data on candidates for the center-right conservative
party (“CDU”) and the center-left social democratic party (“SPD”). Estimating the model
on the separate sample, I ﬁnd no signiﬁcant eﬀect of the particular party aﬃliation. Point
estimates are slightly higher for SPD candidates, however, the diﬀerences is imprecisely
measured even if I include further covariates (time dummies, mayor status, municipality
size, economic variables).
Further, the electoral advantage is constant over time. I split the sample in half, using
observations from before the year 1980 and after. The diﬀerences in the estimates are
insigniﬁcant from zero. The same is the case when I estimate the model by each decade.
This is interesting as it highlights that the incumbency advantage for German mayors was
present and substantial even when Germany was just a young democracy shortly after
World War II.
In panel 2 of table 5, I turn to subgroup analysis using economic variables that proxy
the ﬁscal state of the municipality. At ﬁrst, I look at the diﬀerence in total expenditures
(per capita) from the year before the incumbent mayor took oﬃce to the year before the
next mayoral election. This diﬀerence is informative on whether the incumbent mayor was
successful in increasing the expenditure level or not. I split the sample at the median of the
23The choice of 5,000 eligible voters is arbitrary. The intention was to capture a notion of a larger local
center versus a village. The precise devision is not of crucial importance and results remain comparable
for alternative thresholds such as 3,000, 4,000 or 10,000.
24I also run estimations in which I include both the full-time versus part-time mayor variables and the
measure of municipality size. From that horse race model, I ﬁnd that it is the mayor’s position that
prevails (in the same magnitude) and the municipality eﬀect turns insigniﬁcant. Results are available
upon request.
19distribution and compare the half that increased expenditures most to those that increased
only slightly or lowered the expenditure level. I ﬁnd that higher spending correlates with
a larger incumbency estimate. The diﬀerence is a signiﬁcant increase of 16-27 percentage
points in the probability of winning. Voters reward the incumbent mayor for spending
hikes.
In contrast, voters do not take local debt levels into account when voting for the next mayor.
I again split the sample at the median of the distribution for new debt and ﬁnd that the
incumbency advantage is similar in both groups. Finally, I also compare municipalities with
regard to the increase or decrease in the level of revenue from the local business (trade) tax.
This measure is interesting as it proxies for a successful local business activity as opposed
to expenditures, which can be increased even if the local economy is not doing well. Here,
I ﬁnd sizable and marginally signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the order of 9-14 percentage points.
Note that those eﬀects are notably smaller than the ﬁndings for the expenditure level.
As argued above, the ﬁndings in the subgroup analysis for the economic variables should not
be taken at face value. Issues of selection into the respective groups and problems of omitted
variable bias are of large concern in the interpretation of those results. However, comparing
the results for expenditures, debt and revenues are still quite informative. Changes in
expenditures are clearly visible to the voters and will be associated with the work of the
incumbent mayor. Here, I ﬁnd clear and sizable eﬀects. Voters know if the local economy is
booming (proxied by the revenue from trade tax), although, this fact is not directly linked
to the mayor’s work. The eﬀect reported is smaller, but still meaningful. The local debt
level is not directly assessable by the voter and exerts no eﬀect whatsoever.
To infer whether the results of the party incumbency advantage are speciﬁc to the state
of Bavaria, I also collected data on mayoral elections in further German states both in
the former western part and in states from the former east.25 In particular, I obtained
data on elections in Hessen, Rheinland-Pfalz, Saarland for the west, and Brandenburg and
Thüringen for the east. For generalisation, comparing the incumbency advantage estimate
from Bavaria with other states is of interest. Bavaria grants mayors a strong position in
local politics, whereas other states in Germany have local constitutions with a less powerful
mayor position. Also, German states from the former east might be fundamentally diﬀerent
as the democracy there is still young and political competition diﬀers.
In table 6, I show the results of the RDD analysis in the additional German states. In panel
1, I present the estimates of diﬀerent speciﬁcation in the three western states. The party
25For the general analysis I use only data for Bavaria. The data from the other states is limited as the
time series is quite short and economic variables are not generally available.
20Table 6: Evidence from additional states
Dependent variable: Probability of winning
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel 1 : Western states
d 0.538*** 0.496*** 0.573*** 0.461*** 0.469***
(0.073) (0.106) (0.142) (0.047) (0.066)
N 131 66 131 1153 1153
R2 0.30 0.25 0.30 0.32 0.32
Panel 2 : Eastern states
d 0.248 0.192 0.066 0.337*** 0.398**
(0.152) (0.229) (0.284) (0.080) (0.164)
N 44 21 44 478 478
R2 0.06 0.04 0.08 0.32 0.32
Sample 5 % 2 % 5 % 60% 60%
Control function none none linear linear 4th order
Notes: Signiﬁcance levels: * p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01. Standard errors in
parentheses are robust and clustered on the level of each individual municipality election.
The dependent variables is the indicator variable whether the respective party obtained
the mayor’s oﬃce in t. Panel 1 highlights the results for the western states of Hessen
(1993-2009), Rheinland-Pfalz (1994-2009) and Saarland (1994-2009). Panel 2 investigates
the sample of former east states Thüringen (1999-2009) and Brandenburg (2001-2010).
The Columns 1 and 2 are based on a limited sample within margins of 5% and 2%. The
estimations in columns 3-5 include a polynom control function of the degree indicated which
is speciﬁed to be ﬂexible on both sides of the threshold. Source: Own calculations.
incumbency advantage in those states is a large and signiﬁcant eﬀect in the order of 46-57
percentage points in the probability of winning in the next mayoral election. Point estimates
are slightly larger than the results for Bavaria (compare table 3), however, those diﬀerences
are not statistically signiﬁcant. In the states of the former east (panel 2), estimation results
are more variable, partly due to the smaller sample size. The eﬀects appear to be smaller
and often insigniﬁcant from zero, although, also here no statistical signiﬁcant diﬀerence to
the results of Bavaria can be stated. Overall, the incumbency advantage eﬀect in other
German states are comparable to the estimates of Bavaria.
4.3 Validity of the RDD
The evidence above crucially relies on the validity of the identifying assumptions. While
it is impossible to directly observe whether the election outcome and hence the treatment
was subject to suﬃcient randomness, there are two implicit tests. If treatment is indeed
randomly assigned close to the threshold, the observations must be comparable in predeter-
mined observables. Also, given random local assignment, I should not observe diﬀerences
21in the number of observation around the threshold.
Table 7 in the appendix highlights the ﬁrst test for a broad range of predetermined variables.
I distinguish between two groups of variables: political variables of past election periods
and elections as well as economic variables. I show the results of the model in eq. 3
using the predetermined observables as the dependent variable. I thereby test, whether the
distribution diﬀers signiﬁcantly at the threshold. The test conﬁrms the validity of RDD if
I ﬁnd no signiﬁcant diﬀerences. For all variables I use the predetermined observables both
for the last and the next to last election (or election period) and I present estimation results
for three diﬀerent speciﬁcations.
As political variables (see panel 1) I use the following observables: Party incumbency status
in prior election periods, the votes share of the party in past elections, the participation
in the mayoral race, mayoral position (full-time or part-time), number of candidates in the
ﬁrst round of the mayoral election, number of eligible voters and the turnout rate. I ﬁnd
no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in either of those variables for any speciﬁcation. Speciﬁcally, the
fact that the incumbent status and the vote share come out to be well balanced is assuring
that the quasi-experiment is valid. Caughey and Sekhon (2010) argue that exactly these
variables are of major concern for the validity of the design.26
In panel 2, I also check the distributions of the ﬁscal data just prior to the past elections
(the observation refers to the year before the election). Again, I ﬁnd no predetermined
diﬀerences in any of the following variables: total municipal expenditures (per year and
capita), the stock of debt (per capita), the revenue from trade tax (per capita) and a
measure of taxing power (share of tax revenue to total revenue).
The argument of perfectly balanced predetermined variables not only includes the mean
of the distribution but also higher moments of the predetermined variable distribution.
Therefore, I group the data in bins (one percentage point in the margin of victory) and
compute the standard deviation per bin both for past incumbency status and the prior
vote shares of the party. Figure 3 in the appendix shows that also the 2nd moment of the
distribution of these predetermined variable is well balanced around the threshold.
As a second check, I also investigate the number of observations just around the threshold.
Given that assignment is random close to the threshold, I should not observe any diﬀerences
26They show that a similar design used by Lee (2008) fails exactly due to predetermined diﬀerences in the
past incumbency status. The incumbent candidate is signiﬁcantly more likely to win a close race, which
invalidates the research design. The argument that they make, raises concern that the identiﬁcation
strategy of using close election might not be applicable in all instances.
22in the observed frequencies. I present two graphs in ﬁgure 4 in the appendix showing that
this is indeed the case. In the left graph, I use bins of one percent in the margin of victory
and the full sample. I superimpose a ﬁtted line based on a linear local regression to allow
for comparison directly at the threshold. Similarly, I also present a graph (on the right)
in which I use a smaller bins size (0.25 percentage points) and observations that are no
further from the threshold than 0.1 in the margin of victory. For both graphs, I observe no
diﬀerence in the frequencies just around the thresholds.
Overall, the analysis of both the predetermined variables as the frequencies of observations
gives a convincing argument for the validity of the research design. Close outcomes in
German municipal mayor elections can be considered a valid research design to establish
the causal eﬀect of the incumbency status.
A ﬁnal test that I estimate a valid treatment eﬀect can be given by running placebo re-
gressions. Table 8 in the appendix shows the results of simulating alternative thresholds.
First, I simulate that a party already obtained access to the mayor’s oﬃce if the margin
of victory was only -0.05. This implies that the candidate of a party that just obtained
above 47.5 percent (against an opponent with 52.5 percent) already (hypothetically) got
the position. Alternatively, I simulate the opposite case, in which a party had to receive a
winning margin of 0.05 to get hold of the mayor’s oﬃce. Both tests show that there is no
eﬀect on those simulated thresholds.
5 Conclusions
In this study, I examine the electoral advantage for the party of the incumbent mayor. I use
quasi-random variation in the partisanship of the mayor to identify the causal incumbency
advantage eﬀect. Estimation results are based on a regression discontinuity design relying
on close elections. The data comprises about 25,000 mayoral elections from the German
state of Bavaria between 1945 and 2010.
The main results show a party incumbency eﬀect on the order of 38-40 percentage points
in the probability of winning the next election. These results are stable over a range of
diﬀerent speciﬁcations. The identifying assumptions of the research design are supported
in a variety of validity checks.
Decomposing the eﬀect, I ﬁnd that about 40% of the total eﬀect comes from increasing
the probability of participation of that party in the next mayor election. The other 60%
percentage points are increases in the vote share of the party of the incumbent mayor.
23Using data from additional German states, I show that the results from Bavaria are com-
parable to the electoral advantage for mayors across all of Germany.
In several subgroup analyses, I highlight interesting diﬀerences of the incumbency advan-
tage: the incumbency eﬀect is larger for full-time mayors, increasing with municipality size,
independent of the particular party identity of the mayor and constant over the last six
decades.
Moreover, I investigate how local ﬁscal measures are related to the incumbency eﬀect. I
ﬁnd that the treatment eﬀect is larger when local public spending increases, but indepen-
dent of the municipal debt levels. These results indicate that voters are at least partly
backward looking and take the election as an opportunity to hold a referendum on the past
performance.
In the data, I observe repeated mayor elections within municipalities over more than 60
years. I can therefore also evaluate the impact of the incumbency status today on consec-
utive future elections. I report, that the current party incumbency will also have an eﬀect
on elections two periods ahead, but no further in time. Given that the score variable in
one period is also the outcome variable in a diﬀerent period, I can use the estimates of the
dynamic analysis to evaluate the global properties of the LATE estimate. I ﬁnd that the
dynamic eﬀect falls short of the implied “one-period” eﬀect and interpret this to mean that
the LATE estimate in this application is an overstatement of the more general ATE.
These estimates for Germany are large, but compare well with incumbency estimates re-
ported for the seats in the US House of Representatives (Lee (2008)) and for US mayors
(Ferreira and Gyourko (2009)). Compared to negative incumbency eﬀects in developing
countries, they further highlights the apparent diﬀerences between well established and
developing democracies. The subgroup analyses and the reported dynamic eﬀects provide
some ﬁrst insights into the determinants of the eﬀect, however, further research is needed
to understand the causal mechanisms behind the electoral advantage of incumbent parties.
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Table 7: RDD validity - predetermined variables
Predetermined variables from election period in
t-1 t-2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel 1 : Political variables
Incumbency status -0.018 -0.068 -0.027 -0.013 -0.035 -0.043
(0.054) (0.071) (0.050) (0.056) (0.073) (0.052)
Votes shares -0.031 -0.047 -0.036 -0.027 -0.051 -0.037
(0.025) (0.033) (0.024) (0.027) (0.036) (0.025)
Participation in mayor race 0.065* 0.046 0.046 0.044 0.037 0.004
(0.039) (0.049) (0.037) (0.044) (0.057) (0.041)
Mayor status -0.015 -0.003 -0.035 0.015 0.028 -0.007
(0.031) (0.040) (0.028) (0.030) (0.038) (0.028)
# of candidates in the race -0.029* -0.013 -0.005 -0.035 -0.066 0.010
(0.016) (0.017) (0.019) (0.042) (0.054) (0.040)
# of voters -36.799 -56.613 -114.680 -90.747 -125.410 -112.773
(184.528) (221.843) (156.768) (172.337) (209.599) (147.720)
Turnout rate -0.001 -0.002 0.001 0.004 0.002 0.007
(0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005)
Panel 2 : Economic variables
Expenditures (per capita) 34.870 59.877 2.222 41.210 50.113 44.046
(43.471) (55.487) (43.900) (61.528) (81.028) (56.295)
Debt (per capita) 0.248 0.385 0.772 -9.998 -8.056 -5.490
(0.231) (0.370) (0.638) (9.570) (7.668) (5.333)
Revenue from trade tax (per capita) 7.952 10.141 0.456 19.308 4.758 3.181
(10.541) (14.261) (12.626) (13.713) (16.441) (13.347)
Tax power -0.009 -0.010 -0.005 -0.008 -0.009 -0.008
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.011) (0.008)
Sample 2 % 5 % 60% 2 % 5% 60%
Control function none linear 4th order none linear 4rd order
Notes: Signiﬁcance levels: * p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01. Standard errors in parentheses are robust and clustered on the level
of each individual municipality election. The dependent variables are indicated in the left column. Each regression coeﬃcient represents
the result from a RDD analysis on the predetermined outcome. The Columns 1 and 4 are based on a limited sample within a margin
of 2%. Column 2 and 5 consider a 5% limited sample and a linear control function and columns 3 and 6 include the full sample (60%
margin) and a fourth-order polynomial control function which is ﬂexible on both sides of the threshold. Source: Own calculations.
28Table 8: RDD validity - Placebo test (-5 percent, +5 percent)
- 5 percent + 5 percent
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
d 0.033 0.036 0.032 -0.018 -0.014 0.030
(0.038) (0.050) (0.028) (0.042) (0.055) (0.030)
N 516 1243 13797 471 1210 13797
R2 0.00 0.00 0.29 0.00 0.00 0.29
Sample 2 % 5 % full 2 % 5 % full
Control function none linear 3rd order none linear 3rd order
Notes: Signiﬁcance levels: * p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01. Standard errors in parentheses
are robust and clustered on the level of each individual municipality election. The dependent
variable is the indicator variable whether the respective party obtained the mayor’s oﬃce in t.
The columns 1-3 highlight the results of the placebo test in which we simulate that a party obtained
the mayor incumbency status also if it lost the preceding mayor election with at most 5 percentage
points. Columns 4-6 present the estimates for the reverse placebo test in which a party needed
more than 5 percentage points winning margin to gain the incumbency status. The regressions in
columns 1 and 4 are based on a limited sample within a margin of victory of 2 percentage points
and include only a constant and the treatment dummy. The estimations in columns 2,3 and 5,6
include a polynomial control function of the degree indicated which is speciﬁed to be ﬂexible on
both sides of the threshold. Source: Own calculations.











































































































































































Standard deviations (per cell)
Notes: This ﬁgure illustrates the second moments of the two most important predetermined variables in t-2
and t-3: the past incumbency status and the vote share in the last mayor elections. The graph highlights
that the standard deviations within group bins of 1 percent in the margin of victory are not diﬀerent
at either side of the threshold. The line ﬁtted onto the data is based on a local kernel regression using
endogenous Epanechnikov weights. Source: Own calculations.
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Margin of victory
Notes: This ﬁgure presents the frequencies of observations in the data with respect to the margin of victory.
Each bin in the left graph represents an interval of 1 percent in the margin of victory. In the right panel,
the graph is zoomed in further and represents the frequencies within bins of 0.25 percent in the margin of
victory. Source: Own calculations.
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